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CaseNo.20071022-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Rodney Jay Evans, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for one count of retail theft, a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where defendant failed to raise his rule 404(b) argument in the trial court 
or argue plain error or exceptional circumstances in this Court, has defendant 
waived consideration of this claim on appeal? 
Standard of Review. Where defendant has not preserved an argument for 
appellate review, no standard of review applies. 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
where the State adduced sufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly assisted his fianc§ in 
committing retail theft? 
Standard of Review. When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed 
verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and determines whether, based on that evidence, "a reasonable jury 
could [have found] the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt/' State v. Clark, 
2001 UT 9, If 13 n.2,20 P.3d 300. 
3. Can defendant prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 
he has inadequately briefed the issue and where, in any event, he has failed to cite 
any specific act or omission by his attorney that constituted deficient performance? 
Standard of Review. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
raised for the first time on direct appeal, this Court must determine whether trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). This claim presents a question of law, 
reviewed on the record of the underlying trial. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, tlf 16-
17,12R3d92. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (West 2004), governing acts constituting retail 
theft, provides: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored 
or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the 
intention of retaining such merchandise or with the intention of 
depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004), governing accomplice liability, 
provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of retail theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602. R. 1-2. A jury convicted him as charged. R. 
77-81. The court sentenced him to a suspended term of zero-to-five-years in the 
Utah State Prison, ordered him to serve 75 days in the Iron County jail with credit 
3 
for time served, imposed a fine of $1000 plus fees, and placed him on 36 months of 
supervised probation. R. 87-91. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 92. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October of 2006, defendant and his fianc£, Jennifer Walker, drove to the 
Cedar City Wal-mart. According to both Jennifer and defendant, the purpose of the 
trip was to select family Christmas gifts and put them on layaway until December. 
R. 230,315-16. Defendant grabbed a shopping cart, and he and Jennifer spent about 
thirty minutes in the store together, looking at chainsaws and computers as well as 
some smaller Halloween items. R. 231,316. After examining a variety of items, they 
selected a chainsaw and a desktop computer, and defendant loaded them into their 
cart. R. 279,316. They both then looked at laptop computers. Defendant left the 
store and returned to their car while Jennifer waited for help in the Electronics 
Department. R. 231,293,316-17. A sales associate eventually helped Jennifer and 
put the laptop she and defendant had selected into the cart. R. 232. Although 
Jennifer told the associate she was going to put the merchandise on layaway, she 
instead took the cart to the front of the store, stopped for a few moments, and then 
pushed the cart through the vestibule. She passed the alarms, which sounded, and 
continued walking out the front doors into the parking lot. R. 145-53,165,176-80, 
184-95. 
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Unbeknownst to Jennifer, two Wal-mart asset protection coordinators and one 
asset protection associate had been watching her in the Electronics Department. 
Their training had taught them to suspect the cart full of expensive merchandise, 
especially during the non-holiday season.1 R. 144,174,190. They surreptitiously 
followed her to the front of the store and, as soon as she exited into the parking lot, 
they stopped her. R. 153,180,194. 
While Jennifer was being detained pending investigation, she indicated she 
wanted to talk with defendant. R. 201. At her direction, two of the asset protection 
employees went to defendant's car, told him what had happened, and invited him 
into the store to wait for Jennifer. R. 183,201. 
Because the goods totaled more than $2300, the police were called. R. 157, 
274. Before the police arrived, the asset protection employees looked in Jennifer's 
The asset protection employees were also suspicious because, in addition to 
the chainsaw and two computers, the cart contained a Wal-mart shopping bag that 
apparently had merchandise in it. One of the asset protection coordinators testified, 
"The normal customer . . . doesn't usually bring in bags to bag their own 
merchandise." R. 161. The other two asset protection employees also found the 
presence of the Wal-mart bag in the cart suspicious because "[generally that isn't 
the case until you have to go past the registers." R. 190; accord R. 175. After Jennifer 
was stopped outside the store, employees discovered that the bag contained three 
perfumes, two boxes of hair color, two sets of acrylic nails, and some lipstick. R. 
160. The bag did not contain a sales receipt. Id. Employees found three additional 
Wal-mart bags in Jennifer's purse. R. 160. 
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purse, where, in addition to several Wal-mart shopping bags, they found $60.00 in 
cash. They did not locate any credit cards or checks. R. 159,183. When the police 
arrived, the first officer talked with Jennifer. Officer Topham, the second officer to 
arrive, interviewed defendant, who was sitting nervously on a bench outside the 
office where Jennifer was being questioned. R. 275, 319. Topham testified, 
"[Defendant] was looking at me without looking at me. By that I mean he was 
watching everything I did, but he wouldn't turn his head over to look directly at 
me." R. 274-75. The officer told defendant that Jennifer "was in trouble for some 
possible shoplifting" and that defendant was under "investigatory detention, which 
means he's not free to leave, but he's not under arrest either." R. 276; accord R. 284, 
289. The officer read defendant his Miranda rights, after which defendant agreed to 
talk. R. 276-77,289. 
Defendant at first told Officer Topham that he wasn't sure what happened. 
As the officer questioned him, however, inconsistencies in his story began to 
surface. First he said that he had not been in the store; later he said that he had been 
in the store shopping with Jennifer, but subsequently left when he began to feel sick. 
R. 277,294. At first he said he did not know what was in the shopping cart; later he 
said that he did know. R. 278. At first he said that he thought Jennifer had the 
financial means to pay for the items; later he said she did not. R. 278,296-97. 
6 
In addition to these inconsistencies, defendant made several statements that 
the officer found peculiar. Defendant conceded that, although he and Jennifer were 
putting the items on layaway for Christmas, they lacked the financial means, even 
with pooled resources, to pay them of fin time for the holiday. R. 278-79. Defendant 
also stated that he participated in the selection of both the chainsaw and desktop 
computer, yet had no idea how much either item cost. The officer testified: 
That raised another red flag in my mind because the vast majority of 
people I know, if they're going to go into the store and purchase a high 
dollar item, they're going to know how much that item costs. They're 
not going to just grab something off the shelf and say, "Okay, I'll buy 
this," without even knowing what the cost of the item is. Especially 
where we had already had the conversation about the inability with the 
financial means to pay for these items, it struck me as very odd that 
with a limited financial means, especially!,] to go and say, "Okay, I'll 
just pay for this," and not know how much it costs. 
R. 280; accord R. 297. At this juncture, Officer Topham told defendant he did not 
believe his story. R. 280. Later, at trial, Topham testified, "It was very clear to me. . 
that I did not believe he was being honest with me at all." R. 298. 
Defendant ultimately admitted to the officer "that he knew [Jennifer] was 
planning on walking out without paying for the items, and . . . that is why he felt 
sick and - because he felt sick about her walking out without paying for these, that's 
why he was - went to the car." R. 280. Defendant further conceded that, although 
he knew Jennifer was planning to steal the items, he did not intend to take any 
7 
action to stop her. R. 281. After conferring with another officer, Topham arrested 
defendant for shoplifting. R. 281,294. 
Both Jennifer and defendant testified at trial. Jennifer explained that, after 
selecting the chainsaw and desktop computer with defendant, he left the store while 
she waited to get the laptop from a sales associate in Electronics. R. 231-32,255-56. 
She testified that she had $70 in her purse, plus checks, a bank card, and two credit 
cards. R. 232-33. She said that she intended to put the items on layaway, using 
defendant's VISA card, which was in her possession, for the required deposit. R. 
232,268. Realizing that defendant would have to sign for the layaway deposit, she 
asked the sales associate to page him and then pushed the cart to the front of the 
store to wait for him. R. 232,234-36,256. Not seeing defendant and not wanting to 
leave her cartful of merchandise unattended in the store, she took the cart through 
the front vestibule and into the parking lot, setting off the alarms.3 R. 237-38,259. 
Although Jennifer entered a guilty plea, she maintained that she and defendant had 
2
 The sales associate who Jennifer allegedly asked to page defendant did not 
testify. Moreover, the asset protection employees who began following Jennifer in 
Electronics did not testify that they heard Jennifer ask a sales associate to page 
defendant. Nor did they testify that they heard defendant being paged. 
3
 Jennifer maintained that she did not hear an alarm sound and was stopped 
in the vestibule, before ever exiting the store. R. 237-38. The surveillance video 
camera does not support her version of events. See R. 225-26. 
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always intended to put the merchandise on layaway. R. 244-45. In her view, there 
was a "complete misunderstanding." R. 244. She entered a guilty plea to retail theft 
because she "had been sick for a long time," had "four children at home," and just 
"wanted to get it over with and not have to worry about it." Id. 
Defendant's testimony corroborated his role in helping to select the chainsaw 
and the two computers. He maintained that his intent was to pay for the items and 
that he did not know that Jennifer had a different intent when he put the chainsaw 
and desktop computer in the cart. R. 316. He also testified that he was particularly 
nervous when the officer began questioning him because he was a convicted felon 
on supervised probation and knew that these events could affect his probation. R. 
320. He maintained that Officer Topham misunderstood some of his statements, 
which might have been confused due to his nervousness. Id. He clarified that he 
knew what was in the cart at the time he left the store, but did not know what 
Jennifer might have later added. R. 322. He explained that he knew neither he nor 
Jennifer had enough money to pay for the merchandise, but clarified that he had 
enough credit on his VISA card to secure the goods on layaway. R. 323-24; 330. He 
did not recall saying either that he knew Jennifer was going to walk out of the store 
with the merchandise or that he left the store because the thought of her stealing 
made him feel sick. R. 325,335. He did admit saying that neither he nor Jennifer 
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would have the funds to pay for the items by Christmas but forgot to tell Officer 
Topham that his mother-in-law owed them money, with which they could pay for 
the goods before Christmas. R. 331. He testified that he only remembered that 
money two weeks later, when she used it to bail him out of jail. Id. 
Jennifer's mother testified that Jennifer and defendant had loaned her cash to 
fix her roof, that she had broken a computer that belonged to Jennifer's kids, and 
that she intended to repay the loan by replacing the computer as a family Christmas 
present. R. 345-46. Despite being short of cash to make home repairs, the mother 
testified at length about routinely spending up to $10,000 each year on Christmas 
presents and about the annual Christmas tradition she had with her daughter. R. 
341-43,356. Jennifer would put items on layaway for her family, Jennifer and her 
current partner would pay what they could towards the cost, and then, right before 
Christmas, Jennifer's mother would pay the items off, using Jennifer's father's 
annual bonus check. R. 342,356. Jennifer never referred to this annual arrangement 
in her testimony. Defendant mentioned only that his mother-in-law owed them 
some money and was planning to pay them back before Christmas. R. 326,331. 
Based on this evidence, a jury convicted defendant of retail theft on a theory 
of accomplice liability. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ijereiiad;.. :^oi argues tna, ,.^ trial court erred LA -iLmig to analyze the 
lUlmissibilitv nil Ins piii mi II I ill i,1 n m i r l n m I I T I Il i i n k 1 H H l h l I n \hv. t r i a l a n n f , 
no we v er, defendant did mif assert n nil*1 404(b) .irginnti'i! i lv \A\ ; r"« vv^ll-st'tll"1! 
that trial counsel must specifica
 1 „.ate the grounds for objectioimmie trial com! in 
:
 Jei 11 preserve an issue :rr ap; * Defendant did :;_: i j so. Neither has ™ 
argued piain error nor exceptional circumstances, ^ pMquently, his claim fails. 
^v.a , a^ laiadiv.wii^u'o u.w*i an. u iai court erred LA uc his motion for 
active participant in this retail theft P^fr- J —j/~ •- .*nf faitebothb^ >- ! 
failed to marshal the evidence and because the evidence, when viewed iu a light 
most favorable !o the verdict provided a sufficient basis to conclude beyond a 
reasonable dou L M U ia t defendant assisted Jennifer in committing retail theft when he 
li k\ik\\ .11 lietinsti v iti 111 desktop1 computer into their sJ lopping cart, helped to select a 
laptop rompntc 1 .inil ninni . 'J In thiMMr n\\A\ 1 rd r | \n l - nnv IniniftTlook the 
merchandise from the store. 
Finally, defendant asserts a confusing claim of ineffective assistance, the gist 
of which seems to be that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior 
felony conviction, IJ-.L v ^ , ,
 4 ^iiouid decline to consider this claim for failure to 
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comply with the briefing requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Even if the court were to address the merits, the claim would fail 
because defendant has wholly failed to carry his burden of demonstrating any act or 
omission by defense counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BY FAILING TO RAISE HIS RULE 404(b) ARGUMENT IN THE 
TRIAL COURT OR ARGUE PLAIN ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED 
CONSIDERATION OF THE CLAIM 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to analyze the 
admissibility of his prior felony conviction under rule 404(b). See Appellant Br. at 8, 
10-13. Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. "With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues 
raised for the first time on appeal/7 Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 
413 (Utah 1990). Absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, neither of which 
defendant has asserted, defendant waives consideration of his rule 404(b) argument. 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987). 
In the trial court, the State argued that defendant's prior felony conviction 
should be admitted under either rule 608 or 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See 
R. 306-09 at addendum A. The State reasoned that the conviction could come in 
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either as evidence of "any motive' to misrepresent/' pursuant to rule 608 or as 
impeachment evidence "[fjor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness," 
, . . -. — - // ou^«y. In response, delci idant argued: 
, v.? to tiie *. *tiw ;r*\, t
 4* \ *uiL *K;UJ, *^  
that the dor 'rud- i *- everything to lose ^ ,^t > 
said for an \ -vi.iruii d^endantregardinganv—o*1 -
felony pi executions and convictioris. 1 d 
line of reasoning works. 
3 to Rule 608, where we are talking about a conviction, I think if 
needs to be read in conjunction with Rule 609, your Honor, In read i ; -, 
those in conjunction, I -1 don't believe that they are appropriately - or 
conviction does appropriately come in for the very reasons stated by 
[the State], which is it has little *<•* n n ™*obative value, Your Honor. 
R. 308 at addi"n,. 111111 A Following argument, the cot
 J *-,'d rule 609 as a basis 
for adirt •. - v L »u i allowed it in under rule 608: 
[T]he .
 v o: c . a iciony conviction of an accused 
who tea HI u ~es is in my mind substantially in 
dou bt T * - my probative value to that at all 
'^>L in. ., i aim e makes a good argument that if 
th' tifies, he is on felony probation for 
c a n
 ^ntive for hir~ *-~ -rrisrepresent. 
4
 In the course of discussing the matter, the State abandoned its rule 609 
argument, stating, "Now in terms of 609, Judge, in terms of -1 would agree that it's 
- in terms of whether nor not he's a felon has no - I would agree that that has no 
probative value, 1 will not make an argument/' R. 307. 
1 3 
The jury is certainly going to be aware of one reason for him to 
misrepresent, and that's a fact that he's a defendant in the case. So 
that's going to be before them. In this case there is an added incentive, 
and if he testifies I think the jury is entitled to know that. So the - in a 
vacuum it doesn't come in, but because he's on felony probation and 
because there are - the consequences of a conviction in this case are 
greater than they would be but for his status as a probationer, that 
evidence will come in if it's offered. 
R. 308-09. 
The court then asked, "Anything else?" R. 309. Defense counsel responded, 
"No, your Honor. I believe I'm already on the record with an objection to that 
ruling, just for the record." Id. 
In the trial court, then, defendant made no argument related to rule 404(b). 
The law is well-settled that "[tjrial counsel must state clearly and specifically all 
grounds for objection." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993). 
Otherwise, the issue is not preserved for appeal. Id. On appeal, defendant has 
asserted neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. Consequently, his rule 
404(b) claim is waived. See, e.g., Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE FAILS BECAUSE 
HE HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND BECAUSE 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PROSECUTION/PERMITTED A JURY 
TO FIND, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED RETAIL THEFT AS AN 
ACCOMPLICE 
"Defendant argues that 'the trial court erred .by denying his motion for a 
directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support any conduct more 
cuijjubic tnaniru^ mere presence/' A~rHJantBr ~*-° defendant's argument f " 
- , K-. . ^ „. .;uA:a me ^ . *„•> ;^v. ^ven on the merits, w.s 
; imentfa*- * . l>< '•>^  • - * * 
was not merely rresent but that he actively assisted ifrr Wa!1 mlawfn y 
taking their ulise. 
First, defendant has not marshaled the evidence, w hich alone • allows ti ds 
Court to ^ (articulating marshal) 
requirement-) M.irslulmg letjuiies A ildendaiil Lu gdtlioi and presei11, in a li^nt 
most favorable to the verdict, "every scrap ol i ttiiif irtnif evitlefn < IVIIIK II sii|»;»nn,i. 
the very findings [he] resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991). He must "fully embrac[e] the [State's] position" without 
"simply rearguing and recharacterizing" the evidence. Sfai; ^ irk, 2005 UT 75, % 
1 5 
17, 124 P.3d 235 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Heinecke v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459,464 (Utah App. 1991) (rejecting appellant's claim where he 
persistently argued his own position while marshaling). Failure to properly 
marshal the evidence suffices to reject a sufficiency claim. See, e.g., Clark, 2005 UT 
75, If 17; State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16,989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant has not embraced the State's position and uncovered a fatal flaw. 
He does not marshal Officer Topham's testimony detailing defendant's confession 
that he knew Jennifer intended to steal the merchandise, and that he did not intend 
to stop her: 
He told me that he knew she was planning on walking out without 
paying for the items, and he said that is why he felt sick and - because 
he felt sick about her walking out without paying for these, that's why 
he was - went to the car. 
I asked him at that point that since he knew that she was planning on 
walking out without paying for the items - excuse me - he had already 
made the step to leave the store, but I asked him if he was going to take 
any efforts to stop her from stealing these items, if he was going to 
contact a Wal-mart employee, anybody at the register, or any other 
employees, if he was going to go to a phone and call the police to let us 
know that there's a shoplifting taking place, if he was going to do 
anything to prevent her from stealing these items, and he said no. 
16 
R. 280-81. In addition, defendant fails to recount defendant 's inconsistent and 
changing stories to the officer or the officer's statement that "it was very clear to • ? 
Il I in mi I I'lihjji litis deli HIIJ tlttil I did not believe he was being honest wi th me at au 7 
Defenu CU.ll further fails 1 
:i nf erred from defendant 's re turn to the car while Jennifer was stili xxtox^e. instead, 
he interprets the evidence in a light most favorable to the defense, concluding that, 
even if he did know that she intended to steal the items and, indeed, assisted by 
*.*,.: . .1 ~ .L'dvmg ^ O b not suppor t aeLive . u , ^ 
the infercxi^c chat defendant returned to the sr : r i c *v,v 
Jennifer arrived with the stolen merchandise. 
Because defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling requirement, his 
i.veil a this Court chooses to reach the merits, 
1 uivvvwr, defendant fares i K I I M»I IP» I lie digues tiki I lie was merely present, that he 
didn ' t know Jennifer intend l i~ l •• * • e 
abandoned the endeavor w h e n
 x^ * ^ die store and returned to his car, A ppellaiit 
Br. at 8,15. 
1 7 
To establish accomplice liability, "[t]here must be evidence showing that the 
defendant engaged in some active behavior, or at least speech or other expression, 
that served to assist or encourage the primary perpetrators in committing the 
crime/' State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,114,63 P.3d 110 (citing In re V.T., 2000 
UT App 189, f 16,5 P.3d 1234). Thus,"while mere presence at the scene of a crime 
affords no basis for a conviction, presence, companionship, and conduct before and 
after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal 
intent may be inferred/' American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, f 7,12 R3d 
108 (citation omitted). 
Defendant's first assertion, that he did not know that Jennifer had stolen the 
merchandise, is contradicted by the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. Appellant Br. at 15. Officer Topham testified unequivocally at trial 
that defendant told him he knew Jennifer intended to steal the merchandise. R. 280, 
362. Defendant's second assertion, that he abandoned the enterprise, is an inference 
that defendant draws from his leaving the store and returning to his car. Viewed in 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, however, a more reasonable inference is 
that defendant was preparing to make an expeditious departure as soon as Jennifer 
exited with the merchandise. R. 329. Under these circumstances, then, defendant 
was not merely present at the scene of a crime committed by another. Rather, he 
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actively participated in the crime by loading the merchandise into the cart and then 
awaiting Jennifer's departure .from'" the store in their car, R. 316-17. 
" in in iig Lile evidence presented it. u.v- . ,.uu/s case-in-chief as well as 'the 
reasonable infi'irnri's ih.ii nnlil I Imiii I I IIIIIIII IIIII iiiliiiiiiii H I I M L U 1 , t i | i n ' in i i l i l 
reasonably conclude beyond a ronsonnblr d iiiiihl ili.il ill imdant inrlnil .IK IIIIIIII 
accomplice to Jennifer's retail theft.5 No more is necessary to sustain the trial com t's 
denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict. 
III. 
DEFENDANTS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; IN ANY EVENT, HE HAS 
NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY SPECIFIC DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE BY HIS COUNSEL . 
1
 1 : m f ' On appeal, defendant's argument is unclear He frames 
terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, yet the crux of Ms complaint ^cxxiis to be 
that the trial court committed harmful error in admitting evidence of his p 
Vndant's argument also fails based on his own concession that he m«i 
have ii i\ " \ ery error of which he now complains "'by submitting ins true tit • 
and ! e^ [addressing accomplice liability] made apart [sic] of the trial court 
ins ta l ls _• to \l • jurors/' % ^pellantBr. at 16. 
^9 
felony conviction,6 See Appellant Br. at 17-18. In addition to the lack of clarity in 
articulating his argument, defendant's legal analysis is inadequate. While he cites 
the correct standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he 
nowhere articulates how the law applies to the specific facts of his case. Id. at 18. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
Briefing requirements are articulated in Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
and require not only that the appealing party cite pertinent authority but also that 
the party develop that supporting authority through reasoned analysis. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). A party must carefully analyze and apply the cited authority to the 
facts of the case in order to convince the reviewing court that a specific and harmful 
mistake has been made. An issue is inadequately briefed '"when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to 
the reviewing court.'" State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,^[13, 72 P.3d 138 (quoting 
Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, f 8, 995 P.2d 14). When this occurs, as here, the 
reviewing court should decline to consider the issue on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
6
 In this appeal, as explained in Point One, defendant has not challenged the 
trial court's admissibility ruling pursuant to rule 608. He argues only that the trial 
court should haive evaluated the admissibility of his prior felony conviction 
pursuant to rule 404(b). See Appellant Br. at 9-14. 
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Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ^[13, 974 P.2d 269 (when a party fails to offer any meaningful 
analysis of a claim, reviewing court declines to consider the merits). 
Even if tl i i sCour t were i\j <x<iai ebs aeiei e^ assistance claim, it 
i mi I  I I  I  11 mi 1 I <) i . I * i I > 11 s I  i 1111 • 11 < M ' t J v i » 11' i s i s L i r M ' o t>I c o ' u n s e l , " a d e f e n d a n t n i u sill: show 
that trial counsel's performance w- - ! •j •: * 
prejudiced the outcome of 'the trial/7 State v. Baker, 301,806-0/ ^\j LohApp. 
1998). A n attorney's performance is deficient if ''counsel's representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness/' thus effectively depriving defendant o " " 
. .. .._;lament ngnt ,o rounsei. miLk^iia -gton, Abo L.D. no6 D 
wiiLis&iuns of counsel that p.m IIIPCT 
professional judgment;" iu. at o9U. Defendant must also overcome the star" * 
presumption that his counsel's conduct "might be considered sound trial strategy 
Id ^' > 
. 4 uie pr*jjuuk>j prong, del,jnaaiu .. wiuiectiverieb^iu •* 
finis on the deficient porfuri niiif in * pii uij; ol llio riiiiilysis bcviiiist1 lit1 Ikis iinl * airied 
his burden of citing any specific '"'acts or omissions" by his ronnsol ill ml • n i 
professionally unreasonable. While he generally references his counsers elicitation 
of his criminal history as a deficiency, he nowhere explains why it was not sound 
21 
trial strategy to do so in light of the trial court's evidentiary ruling on the 
admissibility of his prior felony conviction. Indeed, given the trial court's ruling, 
counsel plainly stxategized that bringing the conviction out on direct examination 
was preferable to leaving it for cross-examination. For this reason, defendant's 
ineffective assistance challenge fails. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted August ML 2008. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JO^NE C. SLCtfNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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1 J MR. LITTLE: Would you like me to comment on that, 
2 Judge? 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 MR. LITTLEi Okay. j 
; THE COURT: M i , Little, I won! d, 
6 I MR. LITTLE: Judge, I 1:hi n k i t'" s we spo ke i n chamb e r s 
7 c o i i c e r i :i :i n g I: h :i s I! 11: E or a i :i s d o e s h a v e a £ e J o n y I n 2 0 0 4 1:: h a t h e • s 
-.-en convicted of as . a f e 1 on. 
The — I gi less 
"  '' -i - T think that it falls under -- get my notes here. I 
I_IIJ.UK it falls under 609, Judge, where it possi b_ y coi i] • i 1: - s :i f 
^
f f s within the last 10 years, It's obviously not a crime of 
- ; -*-^h^neF~y ~r ^a-se statements, ;'^f T do. think it is a felony, 
- ..eve •_;,-:. ~ a accused takes the stand that that 
5 I evidence is relevant. Not necessarily the charge, but I" thin k; -
• I". i i' 1 ;• I I h I M j. iji..', 1 11 I I 11.1.J i k I I i I d o l . L h a t 11e h a s b e e ri 
;oevicted and is currently on probation, or has been convicted 
o ' " * 11 i :ii rd de gr e e f e II oi I;,- :i s :i : e J e va nt 
6
 ; Also, I 11 Ii i Ik there's a bias, I 1:hink he has motive t 
ft j lie. I think he does In this Tise, under 608, evidence of bias, 
because he has a lot to lose ., .: ;ie is convicted. He has all to 
2 win if he's not frank and honest with the Court about his 
• .-d 3 :i ill:;; :i n t:l i :i s case. 
THE COURT: Well, let's break It down into the two 
-188-
1 MR. LITTLE: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: First, with regard to the felony conviction, 
3 I've been led to believe that the felony conviction was for drug 
4 possession; is that correct? 
5 MR. LITTLE: That is correct, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: I have to weigh whether the probative value 
7 outweighs the prejudicial impact. 
8 MR. LITTLE: Right. Right. 
9 I THE COURT: How is it probative that he is — has been 
10 convicted of possessing drugs, controlled substances? How is 
11 that probative? 
12 MR. LITTLE: Judge, and I don't know if it's so much 
13 probative in terms of if we're talking if he had a propensity, 
14 I right. Just because he's a drug — you know, drug possessor, he 
15 has a propensity to do. I don't think that. My — the question 
16 I have, and during impeachment is possibly veracity. 
17 THE COURT: We'll come to that issue in just a second. 
18 MR. LITTLE: Right, right. And I think — 
19 THE COURT: But how is it probative — 
20 MR. LITTLE: — subject to — I think subject to 4 03, 
21 J Judge, which I believe 403 — let me just look this up. Now in 
22 I terms of 609, Judge, in terms of — I would agree that it's — in 
23 I terms of whether or not he's a felon has no — I would agree that 
24 I that has no probative value. I will not make an argument. I 
25 guess my argument would be the bias argument. I think that's the 
#j? Pi 
-189-
i s t a r g i iiiten 1: f :: r 11 I€ S1: a t = T1: i = f a ::t 11 i at I t h :ii i I I :: 1: I• = 1: i £ s a "I ] t: ::) 
2 lose in terms of being dishonest. 
That's a reason why I think he would be dishonest, and i 
think that's the reason why Ms. Walker was dishonest on the stand 
.oday j.5 because she's trying to save her husband from being 
convicted and possibly having some sort of parole violation — 
excuse me, probation violation, which would affect him and his 
r 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
notes down, but I - it's i n my other folder at work, but I wi 3 1 
rest on that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: As to the bias argument, your Honcr -
oias argument that the ceiendant has everything to lose by not --
I think that can be said for any criminal defendant regarding any 
iii a t: t e r i I o t j I i s 1: p i: e \ i o i i s £ e J o i i y p r o s e c u 1: :i o i I s a i I d c o i I v I: c t i o i i s I 
don/1 know how exactly that 3 ine of reasoning works. 
I ! s I: c I In i 1 e 6 0 8 \ I 1 i e r e w e a i: • 2 1: a ] 1 :: :i i i g a b o i 11 a :: :: n \; :i c 1: :i o n 
I think it needs to be read in conjunction with Rule 60 9, your 
Honor In reading those in conjunction,
 A a. uon't believe 
;:hat they are appropriately — or conviction does appropriately 
come in for the very reasons stated by Mr. Little, which is it 
: to no probative value, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, the admissibility of evidence 
-190-
1 of a felony conviction of an accused who testifies for 
2 impeachment purposes is in my mind substantially in doubt. Where 
3 I think it would be relevant, the Court of Appeals has said it's 
4 not, and I am very concerned about the probative value of 
5 admitting a conviction — evidence of a conviction, even for a 
6 felony, of a drug offense in a prosecution for another case. I 
7 don't know how — I just can't see where there's any probative 
8 value to that at all. 
9 So in a vacuum, if that were all we were dealing with, I 
10 I would not allow the evidence to come in. On the other hand, I 
11 think that the State makes a good argument that if the defendant 
12 I testifies, the fact that he is on felony probation for whatever 
13 I offense, is an additional incentive for him to misrepresent. 
14 J The jury is certainly going to be aware of one reason 
15 for him to misrepresent, and that's a fact that he's a defendant 
16 I in the case. So that's going to be before them. In this case 
17 I there is an added incentive, and if he testifies I think the jury 
18 I is entitled to know that. So the — in a vacuum it doesn't come 
19 I in, but because he's on felony probation and because there are — 
20 I the consequences of a conviction in this case are greater than 
21 I they would be but for his status as a probationer, that evidence 
22 I will come in if it's offered. Anything else? 
23 MR. BURNS: No, your Honor. I believe I'm already on 
24 I the record with an objection to that ruling, just for the record. 
25 I THE COURT: You certainly have — your record, I hope, 
•\oj 
